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Most companies prefer to use absorption costing rule rather than
marginal cost pricing. This article is aimed at deﬁning the absorption
costing rule as deriving from a principal-agent formulation of two tier or-
ganizations : (i) the upstream unit ﬁxes the production capacity and uses
it as a cost driver to compute the average cost (ii) the downstream unit
operates on the market and chooses the output level on the basis of the av-
erage cost. Absorption costing results in two policies to be used according
to the magnitude of the ﬁxed cost. When the ﬁxed cost is low, the capac-
ity is fully used and a full cost pricing policy holds; when the ﬁxed cost
is high, a partial cost pricing policy holds since only a part of the ﬁxed
cost is passed on. The absorption costing rule competes with three pric-
i n gr u l e sr e l a t e dt ot h i st w o - t i e rs t r u c t u r ea n dv a r i o u sp a y o ﬀs functions
associated to the decision levels: the separation, the tranfer pricing and
the integration These rules are analyzed in the Cournot oligopoly case
and comparisons in terms of proﬁts are made. Except in the monopoly
case, there exists a wide range of values of the ﬁxed cost, for which the
full cost pricing dominates all the other rules. In addition, there exists a
speciﬁc value of the ﬁxed cost for which the full cost pricing duplicates
the monopoly and then leads to the ﬁrst best solution of the Cournot
oligopoly.
JEL Classiﬁcation : D4, L22, M41.
Keywords : full cost pricing, imperfect competition.
Acknowledgement 1 We wish to thank Rodolphe. Dos Santos Ferreira,
Alain Bultez, the session participants of the EARIE conference, Porto
September 2005 and the FUCAM seminar, Mons, Belgium, February 2006,
for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic theory argues that the ﬁrm must use a pricing on the basis of marginal
(or variable) cost, so that the ﬁxed costs are not taken into account. In words,
1the consumer has not to bear the ﬁxed cost which has to be deduced a posteriori
from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
It is known that the ﬁrms are reluctant to accept this type of reasoning; Usu-
ally they prefer to ﬁx the prices on a full or absorption cost basis. The surveys
by Govindarajan & Anthony (1983) and Shim & Sudit (1995) on American man-
ufacturing companies indicate that more than 60% of them use full-cost pricing.
Such a divergence between the business practices and the theoretical recom-
mendations is well known since the seminal article by Hall and Hitch (1939)
(for a survey of the main contributions to this debate, see Lukas, 1999, cf. also
Mongin, 1997).
Clearly the marginal cost pricing is historically related to integrated struc-
tures managed on a command and control basis to achieve productivity goals.
This apparatus may be inappropriate in today’s business world of the Modern
Firm (Roberts, 2004) where the organizations, in search of ﬂexibility, operate
under delegation mechanisms and/or contracts between independent actors lo-
cated overseas. Integration is no longer the dominant form of organization. In
this context, the key role of the cost-based pricing rules has to be analyzed in
terms of the incentives they produced within decentralized organizations oper-
ating in interaction with autonomous partners or rivals.
However absorption costing is always considered as a rule of thumb with
poor conceptual background. The average cost of a product is usually based
on a budgeted or expected quantity of output used to compute the average cost
which may diﬀer from the actual quantity sold once a cost based pricing rule
is applied. The relationship between the budgeted and the actual quantity
remains a black hole of the theoretical literature so that a formal deﬁnition of
the absorption costing is missing. Our paper is aimed at clarifying this point.
We propose here a principal-agent formulation of the absorption costing rule:
as we know, the marginal cost pricing derives from the proﬁt maximization
principle of the ﬁrm considered as an unique decision maker. Transposing this
argument, the absorption costing will be deﬁned here as the result of interrelated
maximization problems involving subunits of the ﬁrm.
Hence the ﬁrm under consideration here is a two-tier organization in a de-
terministic environment where the upstream unit is in charge of providing a
capacity of service or product to a downstream unit which runs the production
capacity and sells on the market. In this context, it is quite natural to use the
production capacity as the budgeted quantity. This is a reasonable point of view
since in many industries, production capacity generates the greatest part of the
ﬁxed costs and is under the control of a speciﬁc subunit of the organization
located at an upper level of the organization.
This two-tier structure resorts to various organizations analyzed in IO litera-
ture, e.g.: supply chain systems (e.g. Corbett and Karmarkar, 2001), divisional
ﬁrms with production departments (or headquarters) as upstream and market-
ing departments (or proﬁt centers) as downstream units (Zhao, 2000), network
systems with providers of facilities as upstream and users as downstream units
(Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a and 1998b).
In this context, the absorption costing rule is embedded in a speciﬁco r -
ganization structure: the upstream unit incurs a ﬁxed cost which covers the
infrastructure expenditures and the overhead associated with the delivery of
capacity. The downstream unit sells the output on the ﬁnal market. The up-
stream unit ﬁxes the production capacity and passes a part of the ﬁxed cost on
2the downstream unit by charging him with a variable cost equal to the average
cost of capacity. Clearly, the absorption costing competes with the pricing rules
related to three typical vertical relations1:
(i) The vertical integration, where the upstream and the downstream units
are merged. This leads the ﬁrm to use the standard marginal cost pricing rule.
(ii) The transfer pricing, where upstream unit charges a transfer price to the
downstream unit; the upstream unit is in charge of maximizing the proﬁto ft h e
ﬁrm. (iii) The separation where the upstream unit charges a wholesale price to
the downstream unit and the downstream unit seeks to maximize his speciﬁc
proﬁt. This induces the standard double mark-up eﬀect (cf. Spengler, 1950).
As deﬁned above, the absorption costing is closely related to the transfer
pricing or the separation rules: the speciﬁc ingredient of the absorption costing
is the capacity constraint which plays the role of a vertical restraint. Accordingly
the impact of the absorption costing in terms of proﬁts, prices and quantities is
likely to resort to standard arguments drawn from the vertical restraint litera-
ture (cf. Rey and Tirole, 1986). Furthermore, the separation and the transfer
pricing rules are natural benchmarks of absorption costing, more legitimate
than the marginal cost pricing (embedded here in the vertical integration) with
regard to the current organization forms in business where the vertical integra-
tion is not necessarily allowed for the sake of ﬂexibility or exogenous managerial
considerations.
The paper is aimed at developing a comparative analysis of these vertical
relations in the Cournot oligopoly case. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section provides a short review of the related literature. Sec-
tion (3) is devoted to the principal-agent formulation of the absorption costing
rule; we prove that, under absorption costing, two diﬀerent policies are likely
to be alternatively used by the ﬁrm: (i) The full-cost pricing policy, where the
capacity is equal to the output; this policy is used for low values of the ﬁxed
cost. (ii) the partial cost pricing policy where the capacity is strictly higher than
the output; only a part of the ﬁxed cost is passed on the downstream unit; it
coincides to the transfer pricing or the separation rule according to the payoﬀ
function assigned to the upstream unit.
The Cournot oligopoly case is analyzed in section 4. Two types of infor-
mational structures are considered according to whether the downstream unit
of any ﬁrm observes the capacities of the rivals (referred to as open loop and
closed loop equilibrium in the dynamic games literature) . They yield diﬀerent
results in the separation and the transfer pricing cases since it implies a nar-
rower competition between the downstream units. Either in closed loop or in
open loop, for intermediate values of the ﬁxed cost, the absorption costing leads
to a coexistence of a full-cost and a partial cost pricing equilibrium. Section
(5) is devoted to a systematic proﬁt comparison of the various pricing rules.
Except in the monopoly case, there exists a wide range of values of the ﬁxed
cost where the full-cost pricing dominates all the other rules. In addition, there
exists a speciﬁc value of the ﬁxed cost for which the full-cost pricing duplicates
the monopoly and then leads to the ﬁrst best solution of the Cournot oligopoly.
Concluding remarks are given in section (6).
1We do not consider here two-part tariﬀ pricing rules, assuming for instance that resale
opportunities cannot be prevented at the downstream level.
32 Related literature
Hence the recent literature has advocated the strategic content of the absorp-
tion costing practices: What actually matters is the type of cost reporting and
internal accounting practices used by the organization and its impact on the
performance of the ﬁrms according to the strategic interactions at work in the
competitive environment: Alles & Datar (1998) use a two-tier structure of the
ﬁrm; they develop a model where two oligopolistic decentralized ﬁrms strategi-
cally select their cost-based transfer prices between production and marketing
departments. They show how a cost-based transfer price can be used as a
competitive weapon through a cross subsidization of some products. Other con-
tributions in this vein include Narayanan (2000) and Hughes and Kao (1998).
Our contribution is in the line of Göx (2000) who analyses the use of the
transfer pricing as a strategic device in divizionalized ﬁrms operating on a price
setting diﬀerentiated duopoly. This author shows that the adoption of an ab-
sorption costing rule is perceived by any ﬁrm as signalling that the opponent
uses transfer prices above marginal cost and then is a source of higher proﬁts
for both duopolists; Göx introduces the absorption costing without stressing the
fact that its existence conditions are not satisﬁed for high values of the ﬁxed
cost. In addition the separation case is not considered by this author although
it should not be dominated by the transfer pricing in a price setting duopoly.
Our contribution deals with Cournot oligopoly competition which allows us
to analyze the sensitivity of the results with respect to the industry concentra-
tion (measured by the number of oligopolists). In this quantity setting context,
the transfer pricing rule is dominated by all the other rules. The separation
case deserves a particular attention as it coincides with the absorption costing
rule for high values of the ﬁxed cost. The separation is compared with the in-
tegration as in Greenhut and Ohta (1979), Lin, (1988), Bonanno and Vickers,
(1988) and similar results are found.
3 A principal-agent formulation of absorption
costing
We consider here a two-tier ﬁrm where the upstream unit is in charge of provid-
ing a capacity of service or product y to the downstream unit which operates on
a monoproduct market. The upstream unit incurs a ﬁxed cost F which covers
the infrastructure expenditures and the overhead associated with the delivery
of capacity y. The downstream unit sells a quantity q on the ﬁnal market at
price p. Two assumptions are made with regard to the capacity management
to justify the fact that capacity y is explicitly considered only in the absorption
costing case in which it plays the role of a cost driver.
Assumption 1: the upstream unit is is contractually committed to provide
the downstream unit with a feasible level of capacity.
Under this assumption, the capacity constraint q ≤ y cannot be used as a
strategic device, for instance like in Kreps and Scheinkman’s duopoly model
(1983). Here the downstream unit makes his decision without taking care of the
capacity constraint which is managed by the upstream unit. If the capacity con-
straint is not fulﬁlled, the vertical relationship is broken with some penalties to








decision variables q w y (≥ q) w





q − F wq − F
downstream
decision variable ∅ q q q
downstream proﬁt ∅ (p − w)q (p − F
y )q. (p − w)q
Table 1: The pricing rules
straint imposed by the downstream unit, which intervenes only in the upstream
ﬁrm’s program.
Assumption 2: the variable cost of capacity is negligible.
This assumption is quite realistic in network systems, where the great part
of the capacity costs are ﬁxed ( for instance transporting networks like railways,
computer networks etc...). .Hence the production capacity essentially plays the
role of a budgeted quantity level with no speciﬁc variable cost incurred. This
assumptions - which could be relaxed in further investigations - yields more
tractable results and easier comparisons. In addition, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the variable production costs are zero. This later assumption
does not change the results, as it is well known in IO literature. The absorption
costing rule can be deﬁned in a principal-agent setting as follows (with the
output quantity as decision variable of the downstream unit):
Deﬁnition 2 (Absorption costing) The upstream unit ﬁxes the production
capacity y ≥ q. and uses it by charging the downstream unit with a cost per
unit of output F/y.She exerts its monopoly power via this cost passing so as to
maximize her proﬁt U = F(q/y − 1). The downstream unit uses F/y as a cost
parameter in maximizing his proﬁt D =( p − F/y)q , under the prevailing ﬁnal
market conditions.
In this deﬁnition the upstream ﬁrm seeks to minimize the part of the ﬁxed
cost which is not passed on the downstream unit through the average capacity
cost. The upstream unit program can be written as the principal problem (1),
where the constraints q =a r gm a xD and y−q ≥ 0. are respectively the incentive





q =a r gm a xD,
y − q ≥ 0.
(1)
Under this principal-agent formulation, the absorption costing rule can be
compared with the separation, the pricing transfer and the separation rules, as
summarized in table (1). Thanks to assumptions 1 and 2, production capacity
is always equal to the output under these pricing rules and can be dropped out.
Such a panorama indicates how the absorption costing is conceptually close
to the separation rule: Using the change of variable w = F/y program (1) can





q,ω (wq − F)
q =a r gm a x ( p − w)q,
w ≤ F/q.
Hence absorption costing is nothing else than a separation rule when the
principal operates on a feasible subset. When the capacity constraint w ≤ F/q
is not binding, the absorption costing coincides with the separation. This guar-
antees the existence of this concept for any value of the ﬁxed cost. In addition
the capacity constraint can be seen as an upstream vertical restraint, something
like a wholesale maintenance price, expressing that the upstream unit cannot
recover more than the ﬁxed cost. Then the absorption costing lies somewhere
between the transfer pricing and the separation structures. This intermediate
position has some strategic features which deserve consideration in competitive
contexts.
4 Cournot competition
Let us consider the situation of n identical ﬁrms involved in Cournot competition
on quantities qi,i=1 ,...,n sold at the downstream level, on a ﬁnal market
determined by the inverse demand function p(q), with q =
Pn
i=1 qi. We assume
than p0 < 0,p 00 ≤ 0. Each ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed cost F. The net (of ﬁxed cost)
industry proﬁti spq − nF and the gross industry proﬁti spq.
Clearly, in the integration case, the standard Cournot equilibrium is found ,
with a global quantity qv =
Pn
i=1 qv
i solution of p + p0q/n =0 .
The other pricing rules deal with a two-stage game setting: At stage 1, the
upstream units simultaneously ﬁxt h eyi or wi; at stage 2, the downstream
units are involved in a Cournot competition on the quantities qi.T w ot y p e so f
information structures are commonly introduced in such dynamic games2:
• The open loop game in which, at the beginning of stage 2, the downstream
unit of any ﬁrm i does not observe the decisions taken at stage 1 by his
rivals.
• T h ec l o s e dl o o pg a m ein which, at the beginning of stage 2, the downstream
unit of any ﬁrm i observes the decisions taken at stage 1 by his rivals .
4.1 The open loop absorption costing case
I nt h eo p e nl o o pc a s e ,t h ed o w n s t r e a mu n i ti determines the quantity sold qi
for any values of the quantities sold by the rivals, qj,j 6= i. and the capacity
held by the upstream unit i, yi.
The ﬁrst order maximization of the downstream unit i yields the relation:
(p(q−i + qi) −
F
yi
)+p0(q−i + qi)qi =0 , (2)
2Göx (2000) refers to both situations as unobservable and observable games.
6where q−i =
P








(p(q−i + qi) − F
yi)+p0(q−i + qi)qi =0 ,
(3)
the solution of which deﬁnes the reaction function yi(q−i),q i(q−i), respectively
of the production capacity and output of ﬁrm i. Since the ﬁrms are identical, we
restrict the analysis to symmetric solutions. Let us denote {q∗
i (F),y∗
i (F)},i=
1,...,n; the open loop equilibrium output and capacity of any ﬁrm for a given
value of the ﬁxed cost F incurred by any ﬁrm. They are determined by the
following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Absorption costing ) There exist two ﬁxed cost values, ˆ F ≥
Fs > 0, so that, for any ﬁrm i:
• For F ≤ Fs,a l lt h eﬁrms use a full-cost pricing policy;t h eu n i q u e
equilibrium is such that:
— Output function q∗





,with q∗(F) the solution of:
p + nF/q + p0q/n =0 , (4)
so that q∗(0) = qv.
— No excess capacity occurs i.e. y∗
i (F)=q∗(F)/n, and the ﬁxed cost is
fully passed on.
• For F>ˆ F:a l lt h eﬁrms use a partial cost pricing policy;t h eu n i q u e
equilibrium is such that:
— The output function q∗
i (.), is constant and equal to the separation
output qs
i = qs/n with qs solution of
p + p”q2/n2 +3 p0q/n =0 . (5)
— Excess capacity occurs, i.e. qs/n < y∗
i (F) and the ﬁxed cost is par-
tially passed on.
— The production capacity y∗
i (.) is a linear and increasing function.
• For Fs ≤ F ≤ ˆ F,a l lt h eﬁrms use either a full or a partial cost pricing
policy; the two types of equilibria coexist.
Proof. see Appendix
This proposition characterize the absorption costing equilibrium. When the
ﬁxed cost is low (F ≤ Fs),a l lt h eﬁrm use the full-cost pricing policy. The ﬁxed
cost is fully passed on the downstream units through an average cost computed
on the basis of the quantity really sold according to the competition conditions
arising on the ﬁnal market. This case coincides with the absorption costing
7notion used by Göx (equation (25) p. 339) in a price setting duopoly context.
When the ﬁxed cost is high ( ˆ F ≤ F),a l lt h eﬁrms use the separation rule,
where only a part of the ﬁx e dc o s ti sp a s s e do nt h ed o w n s t r e a mu n i t s .W h e n
the ﬁxed cost takes intermediate values (Fs ≤ F ≤ ˆ F),t h et w op r e v i o u st y p e s
of equilibria coexist. Such coexistence is inherent to the oligopoly competition,
since, in the monopoly case, Fs = ˆ F.
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4.2 The closed loop absorption costing case
In the closed loop setting, the downstream unit of each ﬁrm observes the pro-
duction capacity levels of all the ﬁrms. At stage 1 the upstream unit of ﬁrm i
takes into account the absorption costing policy used by her rivals so that she
has to solve the following optimization program:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨









Proposition 4 Proposition (3) holds in the closed loop case, with a partial cost
pricing quantity qsc solution of:
q
¡




pn2 +2 qp0n + qp0¢
=0 . (7)
Proof. see Appendix.
This proposition implies that the open loop and closed loop equilibria diﬀer
under the separation rule; but there is no diﬀerence when the full-cost pricing
policy holds, since relation (4) is valid in both case and then yields the same
quantity. As a result the threshold value of the ﬁxed cost, Fsc, at which the
closed loop absorption costing rule switches to the separation diﬀers from Fs.
In the linear case, we have Fsc =
na
(n +1 )
3, and qsc =
n2







(n +1 ) 2 .
84.3 The closed loop transfer pricing game
I nt h eo p e nl o o pc a s e ,t h et r a n s f e rp r i c i n gstill coincides with the vertical inte-
gration, as in the monopoly. This is no longer true in the closed loop game, for







(p(q) − wj)+p0(q)qj =0 ,
j =1 ,...,n.
(8)
Proposition 5 T h ec l o s e dl o o pt r a n s f e rp r i c i n gg a m ei sd e ﬁned by a quantity
qt solution of the equation
(pn + p0q/n)p0 + p”p(n − 1)q/n =0 . (9)
Proof. see Appendix.
In the linear case, we get qt = 1
n2+1n2 and pt = a
n2+1:
5 Comparisons of proﬁts
We are going to compare the various rules in the Cournot oligopoly context.
Since the partial cost pricing coincides with the separation both in the open
loop and closed loop cases, only the full-cost pricing policy will be considered
in this section.
5.1 Dominance relations
Clearly the comparisons can be made in terms of industry gross proﬁt P(q)=
p(q)q,since the ﬁrms are identical. Under the assumptions made P is a concave
function, such that:
P0(q) ≥ 0 for q ≤ qm, and P0(q) ≤ 0 for q ≥ qm, (10)
where qm is the monopoly quantity, solution of p+p0q =0 . Let π = p+p0q/n,the
marginal proﬁt of any oligopolist. Since π is a decreasing function, we have:
π(q) ≥ 0 for q ≤ qv, and π(q) ≤ 0 for q ≥ qv. (11)
Clearly π(qm)=p(1 − 1/n) ≥ 0, then qm ≤ qv and, of course, P(qm) ≥ P(qv).
Properties (10) and (11) determine all the dominance relations we are going to
establish now.
Proposition 6 The vertical integration dominates the closed loop transfer
Proof. Using (9), π(qt)=−p00p(n−1)q/(np0)−(n −1)p which is negative
under the assumptions made, then according to (11), qv ≤ qt and, since qm ≤ qv,
the output value qt lies in the interval where P0 ≤ 0. As a result, P(qv) ≥
P(qt),∀n.
This proposition contradicts some results of Alles and Datar (1998) or Göx
(2000). These authors ﬁnd the opposite relation in a diﬀerentiated price duopoly.
9These diverging results can be explained in terms of strategic complementar-
ity/substitutability which contrasts the price and the quantity setting compe-
tition3. This suggests that the type of competition holding at the ﬁnal market
level (price vs quantity setting) matters.
Proposition 7 There exists ns ≥ 3 ,s u c ht h a t ,f o rn ≥ ns, the open loop
separation dominates the integration.
This proposition is in line with the literature on vertical integration in
oligopoly (e.g. Greenhut and Ohta, 1979, Lin, 1988, Bonanno and Vickers,
1988, Abiru et al., 1998, Cavero et al. 1998) ). Under the assumptions made
here, vertical separation induces a ”dampening of the competition” between the
ﬁrms at the upstream level, so that the proﬁts are better oﬀ under vertical sep-
aration, both in the closed loop and open loop case, contrary to the monopoly
case, where the double markup eﬀect dissipates the proﬁt. This argument is still
valid for the full-cost pricing which operates in a similar way as the separation
does
Proof. see appendix
Proposition 8 :T h e r ee x i s t snsc ≥ 2 ,s u c ht h a t ,f o rn ≥ nsc,t h eo p e nl o o p
separation dominates the closed loop.
Observability reinforces the competition pressure since it makes any up-
stream unit aware of the impact of the rival’s downstream decisions. Then the
proﬁt is lower under observability for market structures less concentrated than
the duopoly.
Let us now formulate the main result of this paper which is given by the
following lemma and theorem.





full-cost pricing oligopoly duplicates the standard monopoly.
Proof. see Appendix.
Theorem 10 For n ≥ 2, there exists an interval of ﬁxed cost values [F−,F+] ⊂ h
0, ˆ F
i
,where the full-cost pricing rule dominates the separation and then all the
pricing rules.
Proof. The theorem is an immediate consequence of the lemma (9). For
F = Fm, the full-cost pricing strictly dominates all the other pricing rules. By
continuity of the proﬁt function, this is still true in a neighborhood [F−,F+] of
Fm,except in the monopoly case where Fm =0 .
Since the full-cost pricing dominates all the other pricing rules for a set of
values of the ﬁxed cost around Fm, the absorption costing rule given by deﬁni-
tion (2) is dominant for any value of the ﬁxed cost, except in a neighborhood of
0 and, eventually, of ˆ F.
3The transfer pricing has not to be recommanded in competitive contexts, since it tends to
exacerbate the strategic interactions at the downstream level : for instance, it can be checked
that, in standard Hotelling model, the transfer pricing rule is dominated by the separation,
which is therefore a better challenger of the absorption costing rule.




and n ≥ ˆ n,
the full-cost pricing dominates the integration.
Proof. see Appendix.
This proposition states that dominance of the absorption costing is stronger
vis à vis the integration rule since it holds for any value of the ﬁxed cost.
5.2 Interpretations and comments
According to these results three case have to be considered:
(i) In the monopoly case (n =1 ) ,w eh a v eFm =0 ,Fs = Fsc = ˆ F. The
situation is represented on ﬁgure (1). Clearly, the integration dominates all the
other pricing rules. More interestingly, the full-cost pricing policy dominates the
separation rule. This conﬁrms the role of vertical restraint played by the capacity
constraint which dampens the double mark-up eﬀect between the upstream and
the downstream unit and then restore a part of the proﬁtw h i c hw o u l dh a v e








m F = ˆ s FF =
Figure 1:
(ii) In a highly concentrated oligopoly, i.e for intermediate values of n (i.e.≤
3),we have the situation depicted on ﬁgure (2), with 0 <Fm <F s <Fsc < ˆ F ;
The closed loop separation dominates the open loop which in turn dominates the
integration. Both of them dominates the full-cost pricing in two extreme cases:
(i) when F is close to zero, the ”dampening of competition” eﬀect prevails (ii)
when F is higher and close to ˆ F, t h ed o u b l em a r k u pe ﬀect deteriorates the
full-cost pricing proﬁt; this happens in the coexistence area. In-between, these
two eﬀects are neutralized by the vertical restraint mechanism and the full-cost
pricing is better oﬀ.
(iii) In a weakly concentrated oligopoly case, namely for high values of n,
the situation is represented on ﬁgure (3), with Fm > 0,Fsc <F s <F m <
ˆ F.T h eo p e nl o o pd o m i n a t e st h ec l o s e dl o o pw h i c hd o m i n a t e si nt u r nt h ev e r t i c a l
integration. When the ﬁxed cost is low (F ≤ Fs), the full-cost pricing is close
to the integration case , it is dominated by the separation. When the ﬁxed cost











full-cost pricing dominates the separation. This occurs in the coexistence area










m F s F ˆ F sc F
Coexistence area
Figure 3:
A meaningful property immediately results from lemma (9): the ﬁrms would
beneﬁt to use the full-cost pricing by charging the same level ˆ F of ﬁxed cost
which ensures the best possible proﬁtv a l u ePm/n to each of them. One may
consider that computing the ﬁxed cost level resorts to a strategic choice made by
the top management to be transmitted to the upstream unit and then passed on
the downstream unit. Our result suggest that the ﬁxed cost determination can
be used as a coordinating device among competing ﬁrms, with the assistance of
an eventual common provider of the technology used in the industry.
126C o n c l u s i o n
The optimality of the full-cost pricing indicated in the title of this paper turns
out to have a threefold meaning: (i) The full-cost pricing derives from an op-
timization program based on a principal-agent formulation of the organization
(section 3). (ii) In a Cournot competition setting, it may dominates all other
pricing rules and (iii) for a speciﬁc value of the ﬁxed cost, it duplicates the
m o n o p o l ya n dt h e nl e a d st oaﬁrst best solution of the Cournot oligopoly (sec-
tion 5). The key ingredient of our analysis is to consider the ﬁrm as a two tier
organization involved in a principal-agent relationship. Such a decomposition
have some relevancy with regard to the common business practices: in many
industries, the ﬁrms have an upstream unit working as the control entity of
downstream units, while using the production capacity as a relevant cost driver
for the accounting management, and then a proxy measure of the budgeted
output.
Extensions of this work have to consider the role of the production capacity
in a more general way. When the variable capacity cost is non zero, full-cost
pricing policy does not change and then all the dominance properties established
here are valid. although the partial cost pricing no longer coincides with the
separation structure. Relaxing the zero capacity cost assumption does not alters
substantially our main ﬁndings. More importantly, a particular attention should
be given to oligopoly models which explicitly introduce the production capacities
(cf. Thépot, 1995, for Bertrand competition); the question is to see what is
going on when the production capacity is borne by the downstream units as do
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in a price setting oligopoly context. Exploring
other forms of competition, market structures and product diﬀerentiation is
on our research agenda; as it is well documented in the literature on vertical
relations, these elements crucially determine the comparative results in terms
of performance and stability. More generally, our approach turns out to be a
rather simple way of incorporating increasing returns to scale elements in IO
standard models, in the perspective of examining technology choice or strategic
investment problems, for instance.
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P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n( 3 ) .









+ αi + λiF/y2
i =0 ,
αi ≥ 0,αi(yi − qi)=0 .
(12)
From relations (12), we know that no excess capacity holds when αi > 0, namely
λi =0 ,αi = F





We have γ(qv,0) = 0 and
∂γ
∂q
(qv,0) < 0. Using the implicit functions theorem,














The highest possible ˆ F can be deﬁned as the (lowest) value of F such that
∂γ
∂q
(q∗(F),F)=0(which exists by continuity of
∂γ
∂q







p0 +nF/q2 +p00q/n =0 . Eliminating F thanks to relation


















. The function q∗ is decreas-
ing and the equilibrium output quantity q∗(F) is lower than qv.
Excess capacity occurs for αi =0 , namely when λi = qi. Relations 12 gives
q = qs,the separation case solution, deﬁned by:
h(q)=p + p”q2/n2 +3 p0q/n =0 . (15)
15relation (p − F
yi)+p0q/n =0yields the capacity level proportional to the ﬁxed
cost F, yi = F/(p(qs)+p0(qs)qs/n). Consequently, the capacity constraint is
satisﬁed for any values of F such that yi ≥ qs/n, namely γ(qs,F ) ≤ 0, i.e. for
F ≥ Fs = qs (p(qs)+p0(qs)qs/n)/n.
We have f(0) = h(0) = p(0) and, under the assumptions made on the inverse
demand function, f0 ≤ 0 and h0 ≤ 0. Let us consider the function k = f − g =
q (n − 1)
np0 + p00q
n2 . Function k is decreasing with k(0) = 0,s ot h a tk(q) ≤ 0,∀q.
In particular, k(ˆ q) ≤ 0. This implies h(ˆ q) ≥ 0=h(qs); then, as function h is
decreasing, ˆ q ≤ qs. Since function q∗(F) is decreasing, this implies
Fs ≤ ˆ F.




, there is two Nash
symmetric equilibria. Such a multiplicity disappears for n =1 ,where k ≡ 0 and
Fs = ˆ F.
It can be checked that the ﬁrst order conditions are also suﬃcient: in the
full-cost pricing case, the objective function of the upstream unit is zero, it
cannot be higher in the feasible set; in the full-cost pricing case, we are in the
standard separation problem. Hence the result.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n( 4 )
Clearly, there is no diﬀerence with the open loop when the full-cost pricing





(F/yi)+λii (2p0 + p”qi)+
P
i6=j λij (p0 + p”qj)=0 ,
λij (2p0 + p”qj)+
P
k6=j λik (p0 + p”qk)=0 ,j6= i
λii = qi
(16)
In the symmetric case, the multiplier λij = μ,for j 6= i is the same for all
pairs of ﬁrms. Then (16) yields
½
p +( q/n)(3p0 + p”q/n)+( n − 1)μ(p0 + p”q/n)=0
μ(2p0 + p”q/n)+( q/n)(p0 + p”q/n)+μ(n − 2)(p0 + p”q/n)=0 (17)
Eliminating μ results in the relation: q
£




pn2 + p0q(2n +1 )
¤
=
0. Hence the result.
Proof of proposition(5).




p + p0qi + λii (2p0 + p”qi)+
P
i6=j λij (p0 + p”qj)=0 ,
p0qi + λij (2p0 + p”qj)+
P
k6=j λik (p0 + p”qk)=0 ,j6= i,
λii =0 .
(18)
In the symmetric case, the multiplier λij = μ,for j 6= i is the same for all
pairs of ﬁrms. Then (18) yields:
½
p +( q/n)p0 +( n − 1)μ(p0 + p”q/n)=0 ,
p0 (q/n)+μ(2p0 + p”q/n)+μ(n − 2)(p0 + p”q/n)=0 , (19)
16or, after eliminating μ:w eh a v e(p + p0q/n)p0+(n−1)p(p0 + p00q/n), hence the
result.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n( 7 ) .





0,i.e. qs ≤ qv. Similarly, we have P0(qs)=
£
(3 − n)p − p00q2/n
¤
/3. Then, there
exists ns ≥ 3, such that, for n ≥ ns,P 0(qs) ≤ 0, namely qs ≥ qm, and then
P(qs) ≥ P(qv).Hence the result.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n( 8 ) .
Output quantity qsc is deﬁned by relation (7). Let us consider function h
deﬁn e da si n( 1 5 ) ,s ot h a th(qs)=0 . Clearly, q Q qs ⇔ h(q) R 0. Straight-
forward computations yield h(qsc)=−
(n − 1)(pn +2 p0q)(p0n + qp00)
n2p0 , which is
negative for n ≥ nsc = −2p0(qsc)qsc/p(qsc). Hence the result.
P r o o fo fl e m m a( 9 )
Let P∗(F)=p(q∗(F))q∗(F) the gross proﬁt made under the full-cost pricing












=0when (p+p0q)=0 , namely for q = qm
i.e., using relation (4), for ((1 − n)p + n2F/q)=0 . This occurs for a value of
the ﬁxed cost Fm =( n − 1)Pm/n2. Let us prove that Fm ≤ ˆ F. Let ˆ q(n) be
the industry output produced under a ﬁxed cost equal to ˆ F,which is deﬁned
by (14). Using this relation yields: p + p0q =
£
2p − p00q2¤
/(n +2 )≥ 0,then
ˆ q(n) ≤ qm and then Fm ≤ ˆ F.For this particular value of the ﬁxed cost Fm, the
full-cost pricing oligopoly replicates the standard monopoly case. Consequently,
dP ∗
dF
≥ 0 for F ∈ [0,Fm],
dP ∗
dF





P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n( 1 1 )
Lemma (9) implies that there exists F∗ ≥ Fm such that P∗(F∗)=Pv and
P∗(F) ≥ Pv for F ∈ [0,F∗]. Let us prove that there exists a number of ﬁrms





.W e h a v e P(ˆ q(1)) = P(qs(1)) <P v(1) = Pm and
limn→∞ P(ˆ q(n)) = Pm >P v(∞)=0 , where Pv(n) stands for the vertical
integration proﬁt when the number of ﬁrm is n. It can be checked that ˆ q(.) is an
increasing function of n, then there exists ˆ n such that P(ˆ q(ˆ n)) = Pv(ˆ n). Then,
for n ≥ ˆ n, we have P∗( ˆ F)=P(ˆ q(n)) ≥ Pv(n)=P∗(F∗), namely, F∗ ≥ ˆ F.
Hence the result.
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